

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

1. SIR FRANCIS FESTING recalled that at their meeting on Tuesday, 20th September, 1960, they had invited the Foreign Office to consider the desirability of making a new political approach on Berlin Contingency Planning to the other tripartite powers, without waiting until the new American administration assumed office. He invited the Foreign office representative to give his views on the question.

MR. KILLICK (Foreign Office) said that the Foreign Office shared the anxieties of the Chiefs of Staff over the continued political differences between the tripartite powers on Berlin contingency planning. The fundamental point of difference lay in the American belief that if the more elaborate military measures were carried out they would effectively call the Russian bluff and cause them to climb down, a belief which was not shared by the United Kingdom.

Recent events, such as Mr. Khrushchev's speech to the United Nations and current East German activities, had not caused the Foreign Office to change their view that the Russians did not intend to create a real crisis over Berlin until the new United States President was in office. For example, in recent diplomatic exchanges the Russians had in no way disclaimed their responsibility for Allied traffic. However, if they were to do this or to attempt to interfere with civil aircraft on the pretext of preventing meetings of "revanchistes", then the situation would be quite different. He believed that the Russian purpose in creating a new Berlin crisis would be to force the Western powers, particularly the United States Government, into a Summit Conference. In engineering this conference they would aim to create the maximum humiliation for the United States so as to gain the strongest moral position from which to obtain concessions.

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- (b) The tripartite Governments had already agreed to the conclusion of a paper prepared by the Embassies in Bonn which stated that if Allied air contingency plans were put into effect the appropriate Allied Air Commanders should have discretion to order flights over 10,000 feet or below 2,500 feet in the Berlin corridor. This point should be mentioned in the letter to General Norstad.
- (c) Although JACK FINE informed that the unanimous agreement of the Three Powers was required to carry out the evacuation of nationals, there was nothing to stop them acting unilaterally if they so desired. However, it was difficult to visualize circumstances when such unilateral action might be warranted.
- (d) The three Embassies in Bonn were responsible for dealing with the Federal German Republic over arrangements connected with Berlin contingency planning, and since they had approved the Plan it could be assumed that German participation in planning was adequately covered.
- (e) The speed of modern fighter aircraft made it impossible to guarantee that transport aircraft could be protected by fighter aircraft. Moreover, the Russians might not need to resort to interception by fighters since it appeared that a SAGW complex was being constructed around Berlin.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (2) Approved the... Ministry, subject to deletion of... (i) and (ii).
- (3) Instructed the... aircraft letter to General... with their views as expressed in...
- (4) Took note that... the Defence Staff would submit... the Minister of Defence and seek his... to be sent to General Norstad.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, G.

27TH SEPTEMBER, 1960.

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CHIEF'S OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

G.O.C. (60) 57th MEETING HELD ON
TUESDAY, 27th SEPTEMBER, 1960BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

(Previous Reference: GOC(60) 57th Meeting, Minute 6)

A. SIR FRANCIS PRYSTING recalled that at their meeting on Tuesday, 20th September, the Committee had invited the Foreign Office to consider the necessity of making a new political approach on Berlin Contingency Planning to the other tripartite powers, without waiting for the new American administration assumed office. He invited the Foreign Office representative to give his views on this.

MR. KILLICK (Foreign Office) stated that the Foreign Office shared the anxieties of the Chiefs of Staff over the continued political differences between the tripartite powers on Berlin contingency planning. The fundamental point of difference lay in the American belief that, if the more elaborate military measures were carried out they would effectively call the Russian bluff and cause them to climb down, a belief which was not shared by the United Kingdom.

Recent events, such as Mr. Khrushchev's speech to the United Nations and current East German activities, had not caused the Foreign Office to change their view that the Russians did not intend to create a real crisis over Berlin until the new United States President was in office. For example, in recent diplomatic exchanges the Russians had in no way disclaimed their responsibility for Allied traffic. However, if they were to do this or to attempt to interfere with civil aircraft on the pretext of preventing meetings of "sovereign states", then the situation would be quite different. He believed that the Russian purpose in creating a new Berlin crisis would be to force the Western powers, particularly the United States Government, into a Summit Conference. In engineering this conference they would aim to create the maximum humiliation for the United States so as to gain the strongest moral position from which to obtain concessions.

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Turning to the question of the advisability of making a fresh approach to the Americans at this stage, he pointed out that the present U.S. Administration was on its last legs and the Foreign Office believed that it would be fruitless to attempt to thrash out any matters of major importance with them now. He had just returned from Washington where it was notable that the forthcoming election tended to make the Americans unwilling to discuss minor matters whilst on major matters they tended to take a much tougher line than usual. Berlin contingency planning was a major matter and if we attempted to discuss this problem with them now, he believed that they would adopt an even more inflexible attitude.

In discussion the point was made that there was evidence that the Russians were exercising restraint on the East Germans. It seemed improbable that Khrushchev was bluffing in his desire for a Summit Conference after the elections and accordingly it seemed unlikely that he would play his Berlin card before the New Year.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Took note of the views expressed by the Foreign Office representative.

1. Operation JACK PIKE

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(Previous Reference: COM(60)5121 Meeting, Minute 6)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a memorandum by the Air Ministry, which examined a tripartite plan (JACK PIKE) for Berlin Airlift and Air Access Contingencies which had been prepared by CINC USAFE, approved by General Horsted and forwarded to the tripartite military authorities for the preparation of national supporting plans.

SIR THOMAS PIKE said that the JACK PIKE Plan collated existing United Kingdom airlift plans and was generally acceptable subject to revision in the light of certain points made in the report by the Air Ministry. However, he wished to withdraw two of these points. ~~First, paragraph 7(b)(i), referred to the need to point out that the commencement of the NATO power and full preparations for global operations required before tactical air operations were undertaken; this view had already been expressed to General Horsted on another occasion, and he believed that it would be impolitic to restate it in this context. Secondly, paragraph 7(b)(ii), recommended that indirect support by fighter aircraft should be excluded from the plan; he believed that General Horsted should be allowed freedom of action in his contingency planning and that accordingly the Committee should not support this recommendation.~~

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) It was essential that the rules for engagement by fighters and the action to be taken by transport aircraft should be more precisely stated.

2. COM(60)25.
x COM(60)143

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PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

SIR THOMAS PIKE said that the JACK PINE Plan collated existing United Kingdom airlift plans and was generally acceptable subject to revision in the light of certain points made in the report by the Air Ministry. However, he wished to withdraw two of these points. The first, at paragraph 7(b)(i), referred to the need to point out that the concurrence of the NATO powers and full preparations for global war were required before tactical air operations were undertaken; this view had already been expressed to General Norstad on another occasion, and he believed that it would be impolitic to restate it in this context. Secondly, paragraph 7(b)(ii), recommended that indirect support by fighter aircraft should be excluded from the plan; he believed that General Norstad should be allowed freedom of action in his contingency planning and that accordingly the Committee should not support this recommendation.

In discussion the following points were made: -

- (a) It was essential that the rules for engagement by fighters and the action to be taken by transport aircraft should be more precisely stated.

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CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

C.O.S. (60) 50TH MEETING HELD ON
10/10/44 22ND NOVEMBER 1944

REAR CONFIDENTIALITY WARNING

(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (60) 50th Meeting, Memo 6)

SIR FRANCIS FRANKS stated that at their meeting on Monday, 20th September, the Chiefs of Staff Committee decided the Foreign Office to consider the possibility of sending a new political mission to Berlin consisting of a British representative and an American representative, without waiting for the American administration to send a representative. He also stated that the Foreign Office representative should give his views on the subject to the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

MR. KILLICK (P) stated that the Foreign Office shared the conviction that the Russian Government had continued political differences between the two parties since the Russian Revolution. The fundamental point of difference lay in the American belief that the new Russian military measures were carried out they would effectively end the Russian bluff and cause them to come down. A bluff which was not shared by the United Kingdom.

Recent events, such as Mr. Khrushchev's speech to the United Nations and current Soviet foreign activities, had not caused the Foreign Office to change their view that the Russians did not intend to create a real crisis over Berlin until the new United States President was in office. For example, in recent weeks President Eisenhower had made no change in their responsibility for Allied traffic. However, if they were to do this so as to attempt to influence the circumstances on the pretext of preventing meetings of "psychologists", then the Russian purpose would be quite different. He believed that the Russian purpose in creating a new Berlin crisis would be to force the Western powers, particularly the United States Government, into a summit conference. In organizing this conference they would aim to gain the moral position from which to obtain concessions.

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PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

THE COMMITTEE

- (2) Approved the report by the Air Ministry, subject to deletion of paragraphs 17(b) (i) and (ii).
- (3) Instructed the Secretary to prepare a draft letter to General Norstad in accordance with their views as expressed discussion.
- (4) Took note that the Acting Chief of the Defence Staff would submit the report to the Minister of Defence and seek his approval to the reply to be sent to General Norstad.

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- (b) The tripartite Governments had already agreed to the conclusion of a paper prepared by the Embassies in Bonn which stated that if Allied air contingency plans were put into effect the appropriate Allied Air Commanders should have discretion to order flights over 10,000 feet or below 3,400 feet in the Berlin corridors. This point should be mentioned in the letter to General Norstad.
- (c) Although JACK LINK informed that the unanimous agreement of the Three Powers was required to carry out the evacuation of nationals, there was nothing to stop them acting unilaterally if they so desired. However, it was difficult to visualize circumstances upon such unilateral action might be warranted.
- (d) The three Embassies in Bonn were responsible for dealing with the Federal German Republic over arrangements connected with Berlin contingency planning, and since they had approved the Plan it could be assumed that German participation in planning was adequately covered.
- (e) The speed of modern fighter aircraft made it impossible to guarantee that transport aircraft could be protected by fighter aircraft. Moreover, the Russians might need to proceed to interception by fighters since it was noted that a S/W complex was being constructed around Berlin.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (2) Approved the proposed draft letter subject to deletion of the word "and" (iii).
- (3) Instructed the Committee to draft letter to General Norstad to express their views as expressed in the draft letter.
- (4) Took note that the Committee had been asked by the Russian Staff to submit a report on the situation in Berlin and seek his approval for the draft to be sent to General Norstad.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.

17TH SEPTEMBER, 1960.

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Turning to the question of the advisability of making a fresh approach to the Americans at this stage, he pointed out that the present U.S. Administration was on its last legs and the Foreign Office believed that it would be fruitless to attempt to discuss any matter of major importance with them now. He had just returned from a visit to the U.S. and he was of the opinion that the forthcoming election would make the Americans unwilling to discuss minor matters whilst on major matters they tended to take a much tougher line than usual. Lurkin contemplates planning a major matter and if it should be decided to discuss this problem with the Americans he believes that they would adopt an even more inflexible attitude.

In discussion the point was made that there was evidence that the Russians were exercising restraint on the East Germans. It seemed improbable that Khrushchev was bluffing in his desire for a Summit Conference after the elections and accordingly it seemed unlikely that he would play his Berlin card before the New Year.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Took note of the views expressed by the Foreign Office representative.

9. Operation JACK PINE

~~TOP SECRET~~

(Previous Reference: CG: (60)51-1, Meeting, Input: b)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a memorandum by the Air Ministry, which examined a tripartite plan (JMWK PINK) for Berlin Airlift and Air Access Contingencies which had been prepared by CINC USAFE, approved by General Horat and forwarded to the tripartite military authorities for the preparation of national supporting plans.

[illegible]

In discussion the following points were analyzed:

- (a) It was essential that the rules for engagement by fighters and the action to be taken by transport aircraft should be more precisely stated.

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